

Excess capacity: unsolved problem in Tokyo

- Last October in Tokyo we had the opportunity to find a solution to the excess capacity problem. But was not possible.
- This was despite all the arguments and warning that were provided. This will worsen post Covid.
- We believe a key element to solve the excess capacity, implies to recognize the steel market has been operating under two different economic principles.
 - Some Parties operating under market principles and other Parties operating with government intervention.
 - This has created a disequilibrium and distortions in the steel market an its value chains
- In December 2016 the GFEC was created with a specific mandate: To identify and implement the public polices to operate under market principles. But this has not been attained and the excess capacity remains.
- We believe the new age of the GFEC needs to depart from the conflict mentioned before. Second to design a system
 to regulate distortions generated through subsidies and government intervention and to identify the enforcement
 mechanisms.



Excess capacity: Key messages for policymakers

- We suggest the following actions for the policymakers discussion:
 - 1. To have a deep analysis of the SEAISI report presented last march (2020) to the OECD Steel Committee and understand its implications. This report is warning of a regional excess capacity of 61.5 MT.
 - 2. To distinguish the excess capacity problem in two ways: excess capacity as result of weak demand and excess capacity as result of government intervention.
 - 3. To identify those countries applying measures to incentive exports.
 - 4. To recognize the steel market has been operating under two different economic principles: market principles vs government intervention.
 - 5. To design a system oriented to regulate market distortions and identify the specific solutions that can be obtained.

